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Abstract:  
We examine the  effects of famine relief efforts (food aid) in regions undergoing civil 
war. In our model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid entering the region. How much 
they loot affects their choice of army size ; therefore the manner in which aid is 
delivered influences warfare. We identify a delivery plan for aid which minimizes total 
recruitment in equilibrium. 
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1 Introduction
Humanitarian relief benefits more than just those in need of help. Aid agencies
hire local personnel, buy local goods, rent local means of transportation, pay bribes,
make deals, etc. And millions of dollars’ worth of aid assets are stolen. Much of
this commercial and appropriative activity is organized by a regional potentate or
warlord. Sometimes “organized” is not the right word, but the proceeds do trickle
upwards. Attracting food aid, as journalists and humanitarian aid workers have
testified, has become an end it itself (Maren, 1997; Shawcross, 2000; Shearer, 2000).
This is all amplified during civil conflict. The atmosphere of confusion, prolifera-
tion of weaponry, and erosion of property rights and accountability which accompany
civil war multiply opportunities for appropriation by warlords.
Stolen aid is put to many uses. Aid agencies know this, and expect part of their
shipments to be stolen. Weiss and Collins (2000) explain:
Combatants steal or extort relief assets for a number of reasons: to sell or
trade them in exchange for other assets, such as guns or land mines; to feed
combatants and provide them with medical supplies (. . . ) and to use in
exchange for sexual favors. In addition to humanitarian goods, combatants
may receive cash for providing protection to relief workers or relief warehouses
and for allowing access to certain roads, airfields, or ports. (. . . ) Relief
agencies have often implicitly or explicitly cut deals and accepted that a
portion of their relief assets will be diverted to combatants — a kind of “tax”
or “cost of doing business” in war zones.
In this paper, we study a country undergoing both food shortage and civil conflict.
Farmers are unable to raise enough food to survive. Some of them are recruited by
warlords. Then an aid agency provides relief to the rest. When delivering aid, the
agency must choose a port of entry, and each port is controlled by a different warlord.
A fraction of all aid is stolen at the port of entry by the local warlord.
Though the agency delivers aid after the warlords have recruited soldiers and
done battle, it can make an announcement prior to recruitment. This announcement
details how aid will be delivered, i.e. which port(s) of entry will be used, contingent
on the size of each warlord’s army. We assume — sensibly enough, we think — that
the agency cannot credibly commit to withholding aid from those who need it. But
the agency’s instrument is the way in which the aid is delivered, not the amount.
Since the agency is indifferent to how the aid is delivered, its announcement is
credible.
We identify a delivery plan which, in equilibrium, induces the lowest possible
combined recruitment by warlords. The implication is that humanitarian aid can be
used strategically to reduce the size of warlords’ armies.
The following section provides a survey of the related literature. Section 3 pro-
vides the details of the model and the recruitment-minimizing equilibrium. Section
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4 interprets the results and discusses some of the assumptions. This is followed by
a short conclusion.
2 Related Literature
Food aid agencies suffer from a Samaritan’s dilemma.1 The Samaritan’s dilemma is
exacerbated by a commitment problem. In Blouin and Pallage (2007), we show that
the existence of a food aid agency is likely to induce man-made famines which cannot
be credibly addressed by the agency with threats of inaction. In the present paper,
we abstract from Samaritan-type considerations and focus on an economy plagued
by famine and on the verge of armed conflict. For whatever reason, every individual
in the economy (except the warlords) faces a food shortage. We show that the aid
agency can have a determinant impact on the belligerents’ military choices. While
it cannot prevent conflict, the agency can certainly limit its scope.
Food aid has been studied intensively by economic researchers, from its effec-
tiveness at consumption smoothing (see Srinivasan, 1989; Gupta, Clements and
Tiongson, 2004), to its possible disincentive effects on local food production and its
spillovers on international food trade (see Isenman and Singer, 1977; Barrett, Moha-
patra and Snyder, 1999; Barrett, 2001; Abdulai, Barrett and Hoddinott, 2005), and
its diversion away from the most needy (see Jayne et al., 2001). We provide a very
different perspective on food aid: its strategic use to minimize armed conflict.
In the equally vast literature on civil conflicts, few papers analyze the role of
foreign aid as an instrument of peace. Collier and Hoeﬄer (2002) suggest that
development aid does not have a direct effect on the probability of conflict, but that
economic growth does. To the extent that foreign aid has an impact on growth, it
may, therefore, indirectly promote peace. For a review of the conflicting evidence on
aid’s impact on growth, see Easterly (2003).
Most literature review on civil conflicts start with Grossman (1991). An insurrec-
tion in Grossman’s model is an activity competing with productive activities. The
equilibrium time allocated to insurrections depends on the ruler’s kleptocratic be-
havior and the technology of revolutions. Competition between the incumbent ruler
and a challenger is endogenized in Grossman (1999). Coalition formation in a game-
theoretic context has been analyzed in depth by Skaperdas (1998) and Garfinkel
(2004). Skaperdas (2002) examines a simple conflict between warlords; in his model
there is no role for an aid agency, or any outside party. Our goal in this paper is to
highlight the strategic importance of food aid in such conflicts.
We do not attempt to explain the cause of famines. Our model is compatible
with both leading approaches: food availability decline (FAD) and failure in exchange
entitlements (FEE). FAD means there is not enough food in the economy to feed
everyone; FEE means there is enough food, but people starve anyway because of
1Samaritan dilemmas are typical of aid relationships (Buchanan, 1975) and have been evidenced
in the context of development aid by Pedersen (2001) and Hagen (2006).
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uneven wealth distribution. Sen (1981) is the classic reference for the FEE approach.
In our setup, no one except warlords has enough to eat; but when warlords’ wealth
is included, there may or may not be enough food in the country to feed everyone.
3 The Model
3.1 Setup
The action takes place in a small country undergoing civil conflict. There are two
airports, A and B. Any food aid sent must pass through one of these airports. There
are two warlords, each in control of one airport. So we will call the warlords A and
B as well. The model and results could be extended to N airports and warlords.
There is a population of measure 1 in the country. Initially everyone is a farmer.
Each individual must consume 1 unit to survive. In the time frame considered,
however, each individual can only raise y < 1 on his land. There are two ways to
avoid starvation: become a soldier for one of the warlords, or receive food aid. If an
individual becomes a soldier, he forgoes his crop and needs a salary of 1 to survive.
If he remains a farmer, he gets his crop of y and needs 1− y in aid.
The relation between the two warlords is one of appropriative conflict. Warlord
i ∈ {A,B} has initial wealth Wi. He hires an army of size si, paying each soldier his
subsistence level. Then the two armies do battle. After the battle, but prior to the
aid agency entering the scene, the payoff to warlord i is
pii =
(
si
si + sj
)
[W − si − sj] ; (1)
where W ≡ WA + WB. The expression in brackets is the combined wealth of both
warlords after soldiers have been paid. The expression in parentheses measures the
share of wealth accruing to warlord i; it is a standard contest success function (see
for example Tullock, 1980; Hirshleifer, 1988). We assume that each warlord remains
in control of his airport, no matter what the oucome of the battle.
We assume W < 2. Since W = 1 would be enough to hire the country’s entire
population, this does not seem unreasonable.
We do not model the hiring process explicitly. It may be that soldiers are con-
scripts. Or it may be that soldiering is voluntary: at the wage offered by the warlords,
individuals can either enlist or wait for aid. In the latter case, one could argue that
a premium would have to be paid to soldiers for the risks they are taking. On the
other hand, there is sufficient evidence that civilians are as much at risk as soldiers
(if not more) during civil conflict (see Azam, 2002, and sources therein). We do not
include a premium.
Once the fighting is over, a single agency brings food aid to civilians. All food
brought into the country must pass through one of the airports. At the airport,
whether it is A or B, a fraction θ of the incoming food is appropriated by the warlord
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in control of that airport. This fraction is exogenous; we discuss this assumption in
section 4. The agency expects this, so if it wants an amount x to reach potential
famine victims, it must send in x/(1− θ), knowing that θx/(1− θ) will be stolen.
Although we refer to θ as a proportion of aid that is stolen, we take it to mean all
manner of benefits accruing to a warlord from having a shipment of aid go through
territory which he controls. This includes the proceeds of theft, corruption, extortion,
as well as some legitimate activities, such as trade and work.
We assume that all theft takes place at or near airports. We abstract from
transportation costs. And we assume that all individuals who need to be fed are
equally accessible from either airport. These are strong assumptions, admittedly,
and they will be discussed further in Section 4. The main point is that, from a
logistical standpoint, there is no material advantage in using one airport rather than
another when delivering food to any part of the country. We make these abstractions
because our aim is to highlight the potential for aid agencies to choose ports of entry
strategically, i.e. with a view to curbing warfare.
The exact timing of the game is as follows. First, the aid agency announces how
aid will be distributed once the hostilities are over, i.e. what proportion of aid will
go through which airport. This can be an allocation rule contingent on army sizes
sA and sB. Second, warlords simultaneously choose army sizes, then wage war on
each other. Finally, the agency delivers aid. There is no discounting.
The choice of airports does not affect how many lives the agency can save. Indeed,
when the time comes to deliver aid, the agency is indifferent among all delivery plans.
So it sees no reason to deviate from what it said it would do. Therefore its opening
announcement is credible.
The agency’s objective is to minimize the total number of deaths from starvation.
However, we assume that its budget is always sufficient to feed all non-combatants.
It may have as a secondary objective the minimization of warfare, and this is what we
will turn our attention to now. Although we will not make warfare minimization an
equilibrium requirement, we will use it as a criterion for comparing equilibria. The
extent of war will be measured simply by the total number of soldiers s ≡ sA + sB.
Though other measures, such as the product of sA and sB, might better represent
the actual intensity of conflict, the sum of the two is actually more manageable. And
to the extent that the more people are mobilized the farther we are from a situation
of peace, the sum will answer our purpose quite well.
3.2 The situation without aid
We first of all consider the situation in the absence of food aid. In that case each
warlord’s payoff is given by (1). Warlord i chooses si to maximize pii given sj. The
solution is sA = sB = W/4. Total recruitment is s = W/2.
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3.3 The situation with aid
We now reintroduce the aid agency. The agency announces a delivery plan, which is
to say a function α(sA, sB) specifying, for given army sizes sA and sB, what fraction of
the total aid sent will go through airport A. The remainder, a fraction 1−α(sA, sB),
will go through airport B.
The amount of aid that will be required will be (1− sA− sB)(1−y). The agency,
if it carries out its announced plan, will send in (1−sA−sB)(1−y)/(1−θ), a fraction
θ of which will be seized. For conciseness define Q ≡ θ(1− y)/(1− θ).
Anticipating that the agency will carry out its announced plan, warlord A chooses
sA to maximize
piA =
(
sA
sA + sB
)
[W − sA − sB] + α(sA, sB)(1− sA − sB)Q ; (2)
while warlord B chooses sB to maximize
piB =
(
sB
sA + sB
)
[W − sA − sB] + [1− α(sA, sB)](1 − sA − sB)Q ; (3)
In (2) and (3) we can refer to the first term on the right-hand side as the war term,
and to the second term as the aid term.2
An equilibrium is a strategy profile (sA, sB, α(sA, sB)) such that s ≤ 1; sA maxi-
mizes piA given sB and α(sA, sB); and sB maximizes piB given sA and α(sA, sB). The
agency’s plan α(sA, sB) is optimal for the reasons given above. In what follows we
deal only with pure strategies. We wish to emphasize, however, that all our results
generalize to mixed strategies as well. The notation and proofs are slightly more
involved when mixed strategies are considered; it is for the sake of simplicity that
we restrict attention to pure strategies.
Consider the following delivery plan:
α∗(sA, sB) =


1 if sB > max{sA,m} ;
0 if sA > max{sB,m} ;
1/2 otherwise ;
(4)
where m = max

0,
[
2
√
W −√4W − 2(2 +Q)(W −Q)
2(2 +Q)
]
2

 . (5)
This plan is illustrated in Figure 1. It is designed to incite the warlords to choose
(sA, sB) = (m,m), so that s = 2m. In fact the quantity m is constructed as the
2This should be compared to Skaperdas (2002). The contest success function si/(si + sj) mea-
sures the fraction of the spoils of battle going to warlord i. Equations (2) and (3) are arrived at by
supposing that soldiers get paid before battle, and that aid is stolen afterwards (or at least in such
a way that it cannot be fought over). Skaperdas assumes the contrary, .i.e. that soldiers are paid
after battle and that warlords fight over some resource such as aid.
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smallest army size which makes the warlords conform to the plan. If it were any
smaller, one of the warlords would want to deviate by choosing an army size well
above m, thus forgoing all aid but more than making up for it by the increase in
his war term. Warlords’ combined payoffs under this plan are piA + piB = W +Q−
2(1 + Q)m. Below we show that no equilibrium has a smaller value of s or higher
combined payoffs for the warlords. Note in particular that m = 0 if W ≤ Q.
-
6
sA
sB
1
0
1/2
0
m
m
Figure 1. Fraction of aid going through
airport A under delivery rule α∗(sA, sB).
Proposition 1. The profile (m,m,α∗(sA, sB)) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2. The profile (m,m,α∗(sA, sB)) is the only subgame-perfect equilib-
rium in which the aid agency plays α∗(sA, sB).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 shows us an equilibrium with aid. Proposition 2 establishes that
once α∗(sA, sB) is announced and believed, this is the only equilibrium possible. In
this equilibrium total rescruitment is s = 2m. This is less thanW/2, the result when
aid is absent. As we will see presently, no equilibrium yields lower total recruitment.
Proposition 3. There is no subgame-perfect equilibrium with s < 2m.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 4. There is no subgame-perfect equilibrium with piA + piB > W +Q−
2(1 +Q)m.
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Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 4 follows rather simply from Proposition 3, the reason being that
smaller armies mean higher payoffs for everyone, including warlords. And yet peace
— or any reduction in the level of armament, really — is difficult to achieve. That
is the familiar inefficiency of appropriative conflict: each player has one eye on the
enemy’s guns and the other on the enemy’s gold. He must guard against an attack
on his own wealth, and at the same time cannot let an opportunity for acquisition
go by.
Note that if WA = WB, the deployment of soldiers does not necessarily mean
bloodshed. Since the equilibrium is symmetric, each warlord ends up with exactly
his net resources (initial wealth minus payroll), plus looted aid. No resources actually
pass from one warlord to another. This can be interpreted as either a conflict which
ends in a draw (with loss of life on both sides), or as a standoff in which each
warlord’s army is just large enough to deter aggression from the other.
4 Discussion
4.1 Other plans
Delivery plan α∗(sA, sB) keeps army sizes at least as low as under any other plan; in
particular, they are lower than they would be if aid were not distributed strategically.
If α(sA, sB) = α regardless of sA and sB (i.e. a constant fraction goes through each
airport), then total army size ends up being s = W/(2 +Q) > 2m.
One might wonder what happens if the agency announces that all aid is to pass
through the airport corresponding to the smaller army, and half through each airport
in the event of a tie:
α(sA, sB) =


1 if sA < sB ;
0 if sA > sB ;
1/2 if sA = sB .
(6)
Under this plan there is no pure-strategy equilibrium. When sA = sB > 0 each
warlord has an incentive to undercut the other slightly; when sA 6= sB one always
has an incentive to move toward the other. And sA = sB = 0 is not an equilibrium
either if W > Q: in that case each warlord has an incentive to hire a few soldiers,
exchanging the payoff (1/2)(W + Q) for the entire wealth W . If W ≤ Q then sA =
sB = 0 is an equilibrium, but then the above plan coincides with α
∗(sA, sB).
4.2 Transportation, accessibility
The model’s strongest assumption is that of equal accessibility of any part of the
country from either airport. In reality, can one channel a food shipment through
airport A and ship it to a village near airport B without having any of it stolen
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by warlord B? Probably not. But even so, there are definite advantages to war-
lord A from the agency’s use of his port of entry: aside from looting, there is the
establishment of the agency’s local headquarters, rental of vehicles, etc., from his
neighborhood or region. It is on these advantages that we wish to focus.
Another factor to be considered is the fact that war creates massive displacements
of population. People flock mainly to where they expect food to be, which often
means humanitarian aid distribution centers and refugee camps. In going to these
places they often travel long distances, crossing areas controlled by different warlords.
In those cases, since people come to the food, transportation and accessibility are
lesser issues for the agency. Then the interpretation of the distribution plan α(sA, sB)
can be extended not only to the choice of airport but to the location of distribution
centers and refugee camps. According to Maren (1997), these are the places where
the most looting occurs, with the possible exception of ports of entry.
In addition, we should mention a possible probabilistic interpretaton of α(sA, sB).
We have referred to α(sA, sB) as the proportion of aid channeled through airport A.
It can also be interpreted as the probability that all of the aid will go through airport
A. Then, assuming warlords are risk-neutral, the analysis remains the same. The
agency may indeed prefer sending all aid through a single airport. This means having
one headquarters, therefore lower set-up costs and less personnel. This provides
additional justification for abstracting from transportation costs on the ground: the
efficiency gains from sending everything through a single airport might outweigh all
other considerations.
4.3 Amount of aid required
We have stated that the agency’s main concern is saving lives, and that it has
the resources to help anyone who needs it. Since we have emphasized a delivery
plan which minimizes total recruitment, we are implicitly saying that the agency’s
secondary objective, at the time that it announces its plan, should be to minimize
army sizes. Smaller army sizes mean more people in need of aid. The plan α∗(sA, sB)
is therefore the costliest in terms of the amount of aid the agency is required to bring
in. We are therefore suggesting that keeping army sizes to a minimum ought to take
precedence over keeping aid requirements to a minimum.
4.4 Endogenizing the incidence of theft
In our model we have treated θ, the proportion of aid that is stolen, as exogenous. In
reality, warlords could attempt to increase this fraction, at the cost of some resources
(money or personnel). Azam (2002) addresses the issue of how warlords allocate their
resources between fighting and looting. We refer to his work for insights into this
question.
Conversely, the aid agency could, with increased vigilance, reduce this fraction.
One thing certainly worth mentioning is that m is decreasing in θ for θ < W/(1−y+
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W ) ≡ θ∗ and equal to zero for θ ≥ θ∗ [ see equation (5) ]. This would suggest allowing
θ to increase to θ∗ (if it is originally below this value) as a means for the aid agency
to achieve peace in the country. Such decreased vigilance is tantamount to bribing
the warlords not to deploy armies. Indeed increasing the warlords’ payoff through
decreased vigilance or through an outright side payment would be equivalent. The
question is whether such a bribe is time-consistent. Once army sizes have been
chosen, the agency has no clear incentive to go through with the proposed bribe.
It cannot credibly commit to this strategy. We continue, therefore, to suppose that
θ represents theft that the agency cannot prevent or does not find economically
worthwhile to try to prevent.
5 Conclusion
We have identified a delivery plan for food aid which has a mitigating effect on
the intensity of warfare in areas undergoing both famine and civil conflict. The
plan calls for channeling aid through different ports of entry, according to whether
the warlords controlling those ports keep the size of their army within set limits.
In equilibrium warlords obey the plan, and as a consequence total deployment of
soldiers is minimized. Even the warlords, because they spend less of their wealth on
armament, benefit from this plan, at least in expected terms.
Clearly the precise conditions supposed in the model will not always be met in
reality: transportation cost differentials, safety issues, as well as geographical and
political considerations may favor using one port of entry over another. But in a
broader sense, we hope to convey the general idea that the international commu-
nity, through its aid agencies, ought to think of humanitarian aid strategically when
sending it to an area of conflict — and this despite being neutral with regards to the
said conflict. Warlords have long used humanitarian aid to their own ends; perhaps
aid agencies can use warlords’ greed to bring about a reduction in armaments.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose the agency plays α∗(sA, sB) and warlord B plays sB = m. If warlord A plays
sA = m his payoff will be pi
m ≡ (1/2)(W − 2m) + (1/2)(1 − 2m)Q. The derivative
dpiA
dsA
=
[
mW
(sA +m)2
]
− 1− (1/2)Q (7)
is positive for all sA ≤ m, meaning that having an army smaller than m is sub-
optimal. With sA > m the aid term drops to zero. In that range the optimal army
size is sA = −m+
√
mW , which yields a payoff exactly equal to pim. Therefore the
choice of sA = m cannot be improved upon. The same argument goes for warlord B.
The agency, when the time comes to deliver aid, is indifferent among all its options,
therefore its chosen strategy is optimal as well. 2
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Assume throughout that the agency plays α∗(sA, sB).
Suppose si > sj > m in equilibrium. Setting dpii/dsi = dpij/sj = 0, we find
si = W (1 + Q)/(2 + Q)
2 and sj = W/(2 + Q)
2, which indeed satisfy si > sj > m.
But the payoff that warlord i obtains in this case is less than what he can get by
choosing si slightly below sj (thereby increasing his share of stolen aid from 0 to 1).
Suppose si = sj > m. Here each warlord gets one half of stolen aid, but could
increase this share to 1 by decreasing the size of his army by a small amount.
Suppose si > m ≥ sj . Setting dpii/dsi = 0 yields si = −sj +
√
sjW . This is
indeed larger than m if sj ≤ m. But if warlord i chooses this size for his army, we
have dpij/dsj > 0 for all sj ≤ m, meaning that warlord j would want to have an
army size greater than m.
Finally suppose that si < sj = m or si ≤ sj < m. Then we have dpii/dsi > 0,
meaning that warlord i would want to increase si. 2
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose there exists an equilibrium (s˜A, s˜B, α(sA, sB)) where s˜ ≡ s˜A + s˜B < 2m.
Let p˜iA and p˜iB denote respectively the payoffs accruing to warlords A and B in this
equilibrium. If warlord A chooses sA = −s˜B +
√
s˜BW instead of s˜A, his war term
becomes s˜B +W − 2
√
s˜BW . For s˜A to be optimal, then, we must have
p˜iA ≥ s˜B +W − 2
√
s˜BW . (8)
Similarly we must have
p˜iB ≥ s˜A +W − 2
√
s˜AW . (9)
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Adding (8) and (9) together yields
p˜iA + p˜iB ≥ s˜+ 2W − 2
√
s˜AW − 2
√
s˜BW . (10)
The left-hand side of (10) is equal to W − s˜ + (1 − s˜)Q, and the right-hand side is
no less than s˜+ 2W − 2√2s˜W . Thus
W − s˜+ (1− s˜)Q ≥ s˜+ 2W − 2
√
2s˜W . (11)
Straightforward algebra shows that (11) is incompatible with s˜ < 2m. 2
D. Proof of Proposition 4
From (2) and (3) we see that piA + piB = W + Q − (1 + Q)s. If an equilibrium has
combined warlord payoffs greater than W +Q−2(1+Q)m, it needs to have s < 2m.
But it was shown in Proposition 3 that this is impossible. 2
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